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UNITED STATES V. FORT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK
PRODUCT IN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
ANNE SHAVER*

I. INTRODUCTION

In January 2007, the Ninth Circuit ruled against sixty years of
criminal discovery reform and drastically curtailed the discovery
rights of criminal defendants. The decision in United States v. Fort1
comes at a time when the "War on Crime" has altered the landscape of
criminal discovery needs, especially as federal prosecutions based on
state crimes have become more frequent. 2 Fort is significant because
it reinterprets Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(2) to protect
an enormous array of prosecutorial documents from discovery by the
defense. Among these protected documents are local police reports
which detail the crimes charged against the accused.3 What is at stake
in Fort is no less than the fundamental right of criminal defendants to
understand the nature of the charges against them.4
The majority ostensibly decided Fort upon a careful review of the
text of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the legislative history, and
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1. United States v. Fort (Fort 1), 472 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 375 (2007).
2. See Brief of Federal Public and Community Defenders as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendant-Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc at 2, United States v. Fort (Fort II), 478 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 06-10473, No. 06-10478) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
3. Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1-2, United States v.
Fort (FortII), 478 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-10473, No. 06-10478).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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prior case law. However, the dissent makes a compelling case that
none of the sources reviewed by the majority actually support their
findings. What remain largely unexamined in either opinion are the
underlying values of the work product doctrine, and their place in
criminal discovery.
Fort's potential impact on criminal trial practice is vast, and it
merits a reconsideration of work product values and their implications.
Three important questions arise from the case. First, can police reports
really be considered the work product of an attorney? Second, is Rule
16(a)(2) a work product exception, or something else? Third, is there a
valid distinction between local and federal law enforcement reports
for purposes of work product?
This article addresses the questions posed above, and considers
the costs and benefits of the majority and dissenting opinions in Fort.
It concludes that if police reports are work product, they should not be
protected by 16(a)(2) unless they were prepared by federal officers.
Congress and the courts have made clear that 16(a)(2) is a work
product exception, which relies on an agency relationship between
attorneys and investigators, including the police.5 Therefore, as the
dissent argues, local police officers who prepared reports before
federal prosecutors took over the case are not agents of the prosecutor,
and their reports are not work product. 6 However, the dissent does not
respond to the strongest point of the majority's argument: that crucial
cooperation between state and federal law enforcement will be
threatened if 16(a)(2) is not read broadly to immunize these reports
from discovery.7 This article indicts the premise that a narrow reading
of 16(a)(2) would chill law enforcement cooperation.
Part II relates the procedural history and facts of Fort. Part III
describes the majority and dissenting opinions in detail, to allow for a
nuanced discussion of the widely divergent findings. Part IV lays out
the prior case law that addressed the issue presented in Fort. Part V
analyzes the merits of the Fort opinions, considering the strength of
each position in light of the underlying values of criminal discovery at
stake, and then discusses the practical effects of Fort's holding on
5. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note A (1975).
6. Fort I, 472 F.3d at 1125 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 1119 (majority opinion).
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both defendants' rights and law enforcement interests. Part VI
concludes with a recommendation that the United States Supreme
Court grant certiorari and reverse Fort.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
In Fort, the Government sought interlocutory review of an order
from the Northern District of California. The district court had ruled
that reports created by San Francisco police officers were not exempt
from discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(2). 8
Rule 16(a)(2) provides:
Except as Rule 16(a)(1) provides otherwise, this rule does not
authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or
other internal government documents made by an attorney for the
government or other government agent in connection with
investigating or prosecuting the case. Nor does this rule authorize
the discovery or inspection of statements made by prospective
government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.9
The San Francisco Police Department initiated the investigation of
"Down
Below Gang," a San-Francisco-based street gang operating
the
in the Sunnydale Public Housing Project since 1998.10 The record
does not disclose whether federal involvement came at the request of
local officials or was federally-initiated, but the local investigation had
gone on for several years before federal agents got involved." On
October 27, 2005, a grand jury returned an eighty-six-count
indictment against twelve defendants. 12 The federal government then
prosecuted the defendants under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and

8. United States v. Diaz (Diaz 1), No. CR 05-0167, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95791, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2006).
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
10. Government's Opening Brief on Appeal and Petition for a Writ of
Mandamus at 9, United States v. Fort (Fort 1), 472 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (No.
CR 05-0167) [hereinafter Government's Opening Brief].
11. United States. v. Fort (Fort 11), 478 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
12. Govemment's Opening Brief, supra note 10, at 9. Only three of these
twelve are defendants in United States v. Fort: Fort, Diaz, and Calloway. Fort 1, 472
F.3d at 1107.
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Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 13 using the San Francisco police
officers' reports.' 4
Discovery disputes dominated the case from its inception.
Although the government turned over copies of the local police
reports to the defense,15 it redacted any witness-identifying
information, alleging that the defendants had murdered or attempted to
murder several witnesses to prevent them from testifying.' 6 The
district court initially denied the defendants' request for the redacted
material because of the threat to witness safety, but it ruled that the
information must be turned over ninety days prior to trial.' 7 However,
nine months before trial the district court held hearings to decide
whether it should require the government to produce the redacted
material immediately, pursuant to Rule 16 and subject to a protective
order. 18 On May 18, 2006, the court held that the local police reports
were discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E). 19 The court further held
that the police reports were not exempt from discovery by Rule
16(a)(2) because it is a federal work product exemption. 20 The court
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
14. FortI, 472 F.3d at 1107.
15. The government asserted that the discovery it provided:
[I]ncludes virtually all police reports related to the charged crimes, 34
ballistics reports, 6 DNA reports, 23 narcotics reports, 19 expert witness
resumes, 52 Form 302s, 33 grand jury transcripts, 130 criminal history
records, 8 medical examiner reports, 27 fingerprint reports, 26
chronological reports of investigation, 22 firearm reports, and access to all
physical items of evidence.
Government's Opening Brief on Appeal, supra note 10, at 15 n.5.
16. Id. at 10-11, 15.
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id. at 16-17.
19. United States v. Diaz (Diaz 1), No. CR 05-0167, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95791, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2006). Rule 16(a)(1)(E) provides:
Upon a defendant's request, the government must permit the defendant to
inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data,
photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of
any of these items, if the item is within the government's possession,
custody, or control and: (i) the item is material to preparing the defense;
(ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or
(iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) (emphasis added).
20. Diaz 1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95791, at *7.
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offered the government "an opportunity to prove up, report by report,
the foundation for invoking the privilege of Rule 16(a)(2).' 21
The government continued to dispute the discoverability of the
reports. On June 16, 2006, the district court ordered the government to
produce the reports, finding "no evidentiary basis for any of the local
reports to be deemed federalized work product. 22 The court also
issued a protective order designed to mitigate the witness safety
concerns. 23 The government responded with a Notice of
Noncompliance stating that it would not comply with the court's Rule
16 orders or its prior orders requiring disclosure of civilian witness
information. 4 The court issued a sanctions order, and the government
appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit on August 1, 2006.25
In Fort, the Ninth Circuit panel consisting of three judges vacated
the district court's discovery and sanction orders. 26 Writing for the
majority, Judge Graber held that the police reports were privileged
under 16(a)(2), and remanded all discovery matters to be decided
accordingly.27 Judge William Fletcher dissented.28 The defendants
petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, which were
denied on March 8, 2007.29
30
Defendant Calloway subsequently entered a plea bargain.
Defendants Fort and Diaz are preparing a petition for certiorari31to the
United States Supreme Court, pending settlement of their cases.

21. Id. at*10.
22. United States v. Diaz (Diaz I), No. CR 05-0167, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44883, at *30 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2006).
23. Id. at *2-15.
24. Government's Opening Brief on Appeal, supra note 10, at 22.
25. Id. at 23.
26. United States v. Fort (Fort1), 472 F.3d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007).
27. Id. at 1107, 1121-22.

28. Id. at 1122 (Flecther, J., dissenting).
29. United States v. Fort (Fort I), 478 F.3d 1099, 1099 (9th Cir 2007). Judge
Wardlaw dissented in the denial of the rehearing and was joined by Judges
Pregerson, Reinhardt, Fletcher, Fisher, and Paez. Id. at 1100 (Wardlaw, J.,
dissenting).
30. E-mail from John Cline, Attorney for Robert Calloway, to Anne Shaver
(Apr. 28, 2007, 12:27 WST) (on file with author).
31. E-mail from Michael Thorman, Attorney for Fort and Diaz, to Anne Shaver
(Apr. 30, 2007, 11:54 WST) (on file with author).
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III. THE OPINIONS
A. Majority

The Fort majority held that the defense was not entitled to
discovery of the information redacted from the police reports because
the reports were covered by Rule 16(a)(2). 32 Notably, Judge Graber's
opinion never asserted that the reports were technically work product;
instead, the court found that Rule 16(a)(2) encompassed work product
but was 33intended to be a broader protection of investigative
materials.
To reach this result, the majority first examined the text of Rule
16. 34 It found the applicability of 16(a)(2) depended on the meaning of
the terms "government agent" and "the case." 35 Although the majority
conceded that the term government "is used as shorthand for 'federal
government' throughout the Rules," 36 it wrote that the relevant
question was who qualified as a "government agent." 37 It found that
'government agent' includes non-federal personnel whose work
contributes to a federal criminal 'case, '"'38 regardless of when that
work was completed.39 Judge Graber gave two rationales for this
interpretation. First, she looked to the statutory construction of the
phrase "government agent" elsewhere in Rule 16, noting that other
circuits have held that this phrase in Rule 16(a)(1)(A) requires federal
prosecutors to disclose statements made by defendants to local law
enforcement officers.4 0 Second, Judge Graber referred to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6 as a guide to the intent of the drafters,
because Rule 6 deals with "potential cooperation among federal, state,
and local law enforcement."'" She found that because Rule 6
32. Fort I, 472 F.3d at 1107-08.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 1115.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
ld. at 1111.
Id.

38. Id. at 1113 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1112.
41. Id. Rule 6 governs federal grand jury proceedings. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) provides for disclosure of grand jury proceedings to "any
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expressly incorporated non-federal government employees, it was
evidence of the drafters' intention to promote cooperation between
local and federal law enforcement.42 Thus, the majority held that this
intention should be imputed to Rule 16 as well, even though Rule 16
had not been similarly amended to expressly include this definition of
government agent.43
Having found that San Francisco police officers were government
agents within the meaning of 16(a)(2), the majority next considered
whether a separate federal prosecution could be considered the same
"case" as the local prosecution.44 The majority cited prior case law to
support its finding that "case" includes any prosecution of the same
person for the same crime. 45 In other words, a federal prosecution that
begins subsequent to a state prosecution is the same "case" for the
purposes of Rule 16 as long as it involves the same defendant and the
same crime(s).46 But the majority did acknowledge that district courts
have reached conflicting holdings on this very issue.4 7
Next, Judge Graber turned to the intentions of the Advisory
Committee. The majority found that 16(a)(2) is not a mere work
product exception: "We are not persuaded that the drafters meant to
limit Criminal Rule 16 to the civil 'work product' doctrine. Rule 16
itself, while encompassing government work product and having its
genesis in the idea of work product, draws its boundaries more
broadly than those of Civil Rule 26. "48 To support this finding, the
governmental personnel-including those of a state, state subdivision, Indian tribe,
or foreign government-that an attorney for the government considers necessary to
assist in performing that attorney's duty to enforce criminal law." FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
42. See FortL,472 F.3d at 1112-13.
43. See id. at 1112.
44. Id. at 1113.

45. Id. at 1113-14 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996);
United States v. Cedano-Arellano, 332 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2003)).
46. Id. at 1114.
47. Id. (citing United States v. Cherry, 876 F. Supp. 547, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); United States v. Green, 144 F.R.D. 631, 641 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); United States
v. Duncan, 586 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (W.D. Mich. 1984); United States v. DeBacker,
493 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (W.D. Mich. 1980)). For further discussion of the
conflicting holdings of Cherry, Duncan, DeBacker, and Green, see discussion infra,
pp. 138-40.
48. Fort I, 472 F.3d at 1115.
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opinion cited the Advisory Committee's decision to amend 16(a)(2)
using different language than the civil work product doctrine.49
Although the Committee specifically refers to the Rule as the "work
product" exception, 50 it chose to define work product as "reports,
memoranda, or other internal government documents" 51 rather than
"the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the
attorney for the government. 52 Judge Graber's opinion states that this
that Rule 16(a)(2) be a
choice evinces the Committee's intention
53
product.
work
just
than
broader exception
Having determined that Rule 16(a)(2) was not a work product
rule, the opinion sought to determine the true scope of the rule by
looking to other discovery obligations in criminal procedure. First, the
majority found that the Jencks Act 54 does not distinguish between
statements obtained by federal and state officials in its requirement
that the government disclose witness statements to the defense.55 In
addition, the majority considered that 16(a)(2) exempts reports created
by FBI agents (Form 302 reports) as support for the proposition that
all law enforcement reports should be within the Rule, regardless of
their origin.56 Finally, under the general discovery provision, Rule
16(a)(1)(E), materials become discoverable by the defense when they
are in the possession of the federal government. 57 Thus, the key issue
prosecutors had possession of the
triggering 16(a)(2) is that the federal 58
reports, and not who produced them.
At the end of the opinion, the majority briefly examined policy
considerations. Their overarching concern was to avoid inhibiting
49. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P 16 advisory committee's note D (1975)).
50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note D (1975).
51. Id.
52. Id.; see Fort 1, 472 F.3d at 1115. The latter definition is the civil work
product definition in FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
53. See FortI, 472 F.3d at 1116.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). The Jencks Act requires the government to
produce to the defense any statement made by a government witness that is in the
possession of the government once that witness has testified. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b)
(2000).
55.
56.
57.
58.

Fort 1, 472 F.3d at 1116-17.
See id. at 1119.
Id. at 1118.
See id.
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cooperation between local and federal law enforcement agencies, "'to
the benefit of criminals but to the detriment of the public good."' ' 59 It
noted that such cooperation is especially crucial in RICO
prosecutions, where the predicate acts of the charge are often state law
crimes. 60
B. Dissent
Judge Fletcher authored a vigorous dissent. His opinion stated two
initial normative reasons why local police reports should not be
included in 16(a)(2). First, the government's hesitation to turn over the
reports stemmed from witness protection concerns, which are more
properly addressed by a protective order.6 1 Second, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure have consistently evolved towards allowing
broad discovery for both the State and the defense; in order to
preserve this policy, exceptions to discovery should be construed
62
narrowly rather than broadly.
Turning to the text of the Rules, Judge Fletcher asserted that
16(a)(2) is in fact a work product exception, and that it pertains only
to the work product of the federal government. "Rule 16(a)(2) is
designed to protect only the government's work product in connection
with a criminal case .... Because the reports in question are the work
product of the San Francisco Police Department, not of the
63
government, they are not protected by Rule 16(a)(2).,
Judge Fletcher provided several sources supporting his finding
that 16(a)(2) is a work product exception. One was the Advisory
Committee notes, which state that Rules 16(a)(2) and 16(b)(2) "set
forth 'work product'
exceptions to the general discovery
requirements." 64 Another source was case law. Judge Fletcher cited
both a U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit case finding 16(a)(2) a
"work product rule." 65
59. Id. at 1119 (quoting United States v. Cherry, 876 F. Supp 547, 552
(S.D.N.Y 1995)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1122-23 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1123.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1975)).
65. Id. (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996); United
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The dissent also found that the text of the rule clearly established
that local police reports are not protected.66 Judge Fletcher reasoned
that "internal government documents" means documents pertaining to
the internal relations of the federal government, and the majority
67
conceded that "government" here referred to the federal government.
Thus, local reports generated outside the federal government for nonfederal purposes did not qualify.68 In addition, 16(a)(2) protects only
documents "made by a federal government attorney or other
government agent.",69 The police reports in Fort, by contrast, were
made by local police.70 Moreover, in Judge Fletcher's opinion, the
phrase "made by" negates the majority's emphasis on possession as
the key to discovery.7 ' Since it was undisputed that "attorney for the
government" referred to the federal government, the applicability of
the Rule to the local reports depended on the finding that local police
officers were "other government agents., 72 Judge Fletcher argued that
the officers were not agents of the federal government because they
had no prior or contemporaneous federal authorization for their
work.73 He contended that the majority's finding that the officers were
"other government agents" required interpreting the phrase "other
government agent" to mean the agent of another government besides
the federal one. 7 4 This would be an absurd result, because then the
only federal personnel eligible for work product protection would be
the attorney; for example, not even documents prepared by an FBI
agent for a federal case would be protected, because the FBI is part of
75
the federal government.
States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000)).
66. See id. at 1124.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1125.
71. See id. ("The phrase 'made by,' like 'internal government,' thus signals
that documents protected from disclosure by Rule 16(a)(2) are a subclass of the
broader class of documents 'within the government's possession, custody, or
control' described in Rule 16(a)(1)(E).").
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 1126.
75. Id.
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After making the case that 16(a)(2) is textually clear as a work
product exemption for federally-generated documents only, Judge
Fletcher went on to specifically address each of the majority's
arguments. First, he rejected the idea that because 16(a)(1) requires
the state to disclose statements made by the defendant to local police
agents, 16(a)(2) should be read to include local reports as well.76 The
functions of the two rules are different: (a)(1) is a broad discovery
mandate to the state, needed to ensure "the fair and efficient
administration of criminal justice. 7 7 16(a)(2), by contrast, is a work
product exception which must be read narrowly so as not to swallow
the rule. 78 Second, Judge Fletcher contested the majority's argument
that it was acceptable to include local reports in 16(a)(2) because Rule
6(e)(3) allows the government to disclose grand jury testimony to
''any government personnel-including those of a state or state
subdivision, Indian tribe, or foreign government."7 9 Judge Fletcher
argued that the rule drafters explicitly enlarged the scope of
government in Rule 6, which highlights that it is deliberately different
than the rest of the rules. 80 If the drafters had intended the same results
for Rule 16, he concluded, they would have made a similar drafting
change.8 ' Third, Judge Fletcher argued that "In]either the language
nor history of Rule 16(a)(2) suggests that the rulemakers intended to
expand its protection beyond traditional work product," 82 and that it
has the same scope as Rule 26 of civil procedure.8 3 Finally, in
response to the majority's suggestion that the rule be read
symmetrically with the Jencks Act and Rule 16(a)(1)(E), the dissent
pointed out that 16(a)(2) should be read in symmetry with 16(b)(2),
the work product rule for the defense team. 84 16(b)(2) protects against
state discovery of documents made by the defendant or defendant's

76.
77.

Id. at 1126-28.
Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 625 (9th Cir.

2000)).
78.
79.
80.

Id. (citing Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)).
Id. at 1128 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added)).
See id.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1129.
Id. at 1130.
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attorney or agent.85 Because the drafters intended the defense and the
it makes sense that these
State to enjoy reciprocal discovery rights,
86
two rules should have the same scope.
The dissent concluded that "[t]he purpose of the work-product
exception-to give parties freedom and incentive to develop their own
cases-simply is not 'promoted by shielding from discovery materials
in an attorney's possession that were prepared neither by the attorney
nor his agents."' 87 Ultimately, Judge Fletcher wrote that any debate in
Fort should have focused on the "drafting of a protective order under
Rule 16(d)(1)" rather than "the scope of work-product privilege under
Rule 16(a)(2)." 88
IV. PRECEDENT

Fort is not the first case in which a court held that local police
reports are protected from discovery by 16(a)(2) during a federal
prosecution. Two district courts have reached the same holding as the
Fort majority. In United States v. Cherry, the court held that reports
generated by the New York Police Department were protected work
product of the federal prosecutor, even though the reports were made
before federal involvement in the case. 89 Notably, the court did not
discuss the text of Rule 16, but instead relied on policy considerations.
The court reasoned that the work product principle underlying
16(a)(2) would be undermined if it was limited to federal agents,
because federal prosecutors depend so much on state agents' work. 90
"The distinction makes a difference in this case because about 95
percent of the federal prosecutors' investigatory file consists of
documents generated by the NYCPD during the course of its own,
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).
86. In relation to this point, Judge Fletcher pointed out that if the majority's
holding were to stand, the defense could also immunize their documents from
discovery merely by placing them in the hands of federal personnel-a result which
the majority surely did not intend. Fort I, 472 F.3d at 1130 (Flectcher, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 1130 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 318 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir.
2003)) (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 1131.
89. United States v. Cherry, 876 F. Supp. 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
90. See id. at 551-52.
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independent activities prior to a reference to the United States
Attorney for prosecution under the RICO statute ... ."91 The Cherry
court also considered that the practical consequence of making these
reports discoverable would be to inhibit cooperation between the state
and federal government. 92 Accordingly, the court held that the reports
93
were protected work product.
A Michigan district court reached the same result in United States
v. Duncan.94 The state prosecutor initiated the investigation and
prosecution of the defendant, and then moved to dismiss the state
95
proceeding to allow federal authorities to prosecute the defendant.
The defendant requested discovery of all police reports related to his
investigation. 96 Without any discussion, the court held that the reports
were protected by Rule 16(a)(2). 9 7
On the other hand, three lower courts have reached the same
conclusion as the dissent in Fort: that local police reports are not
immune from discovery in a federal prosecution. In United States v.
DeBacker, for instance, the defendant was initially investigated by the
Michigan State Police and later charged by federal authorities. 98 The
court held that the state police reports were discoverable because the
state investigation began before the federal one. "[T]his court
concluded that state police reports made before Federal involvement
were discoverable under Rule 16 .... [T]he Assistant U.S. Attorney
admitted that the investigation of defendant in this case was not a joint
venture by the state and federal investigatory authorities, but was
initiated by the state alone." 9 9 Therefore, the court ordered the
00
government to turn over copies of the report to the defendant. 1

91. Id. at 549.
92. Id. at 551-52.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 552.
United States v. Duncan, 586 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1313.
Id.
See United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1078-79 (W.D. Mich.

1980).

99. Id. at 1082.
100. Id.
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Similarly, in United States v. Gatto, the court held that Rule
16(a)(2) did not exempt local police reports0 because they are not part
of the federal "case" against the defendant.' '
The rule excludes reports prepared in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case, not of other cases that may
have come prior to it. The language of the statute suggests that it
refers only to attorney work product on the 02current case, not to
investigations and prosecutions from the past. 1
For the Gatto court, then, the key inquiry was the same as in
DeBacker-when did the federal investigation begin? Documents
generated before that date cannot be considered the work product of
that investigation.
United States v. Green also concluded that the defendant was
entitled to discovery of state police reports in the hands of the federal
prosecutor. 10 3 The court held that "to the extent that the government
has in its possession reports or records from state or local law
enforcement agencies or prisons, these items are discoverable unless
they are the product of a joint investigation or unless they have
become the work product of the federal investigators."'0 4 The first part
of this holding is, like Gatto and DeBacker, based on the timing of the
separate investigations. But the Green court also raised an interesting
possibility-that state reports could somehow become federal work
product. 10 5 However, the court did not elaborate on how that might
take place, and it is not an idea replicated anywhere else in the case
law.
This review of the case law reveals that the only case
supporting the Fort majority's logic is Cherry, because Duncan
contains no analysis. Therefore, the weight of the persuasive authority
is with the dissent. Moreover, Cherry considers only the policy issue
of enabling law enforcement cooperation. Gatto, DeBacker, and
Green, by contrast, look to the actual text of the statute to inform their
opinions.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

United States v. Gatto, 729 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (D. N.J. 1989).
Id.
United States v. Green, 144 F.R.D. 631, 641 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
Id.
Id.
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V. ANALYSIS

Although Judge Fletcher was correct that the reports should be
turned over to the defense, he was mistaken when he said that Fort
should not be a case about work product. Rather, the issue raised in
Fortnecessarily implicates the scope of the work product exception in
criminal discovery-a notion with which Judge Wardlaw opened his
dissent to the order denying panel rehearing. 106 To clarify the contours
of this issue, this section turns first to the history of criminal discovery
and the work product exception that Fort disrupts. It suggests that
police reports may not fit into the work product doctrine in theory.
But, assuming that police reports are work product, the values
underlying the work product doctrine justify treating local and federal
reports differently under 16(a)(2). Second, this section considers the
practical ramifications of the majority's position for both criminal
defendants' interests and law enforcement's interests.
A. Statutory History and Interpretation
Until the 1960s, discovery in federal criminal procedure was quite
restricted, especially as compared to pretrial discovery techniques that
were available in civil cases.' 0 7 Critics charged that criminal trials
were "in the nature of a game or sporting contest," and not "a serious
10 8
inquiry aiming to distinguish between guilt and innocence."
Arguing for broader discovery rules, some commentators claimed that
liberal discovery in criminal cases is essential to ensuring a fair
trial.'0 9 In particular, access to documents in the possession of the
prosecution that are material to the defense is necessary for
developing a defense theory and obtaining important evidence." 0 It
106. United States v. Fort (Fort I1), 478 F.3d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Wardlaw, J., dissenting) ("The issue is one of exceptional importance to the
administration of justice in criminal proceedings: the scope of the work product
privilege in criminal discovery.").
107. See Robinson 0. Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 1964 DuKE L.J.

477, 477 (1964).
108. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or

Quest for the Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L. Q. 279, 279 (1963) (quoting Williams,
Advance Notice of the Defence, 1959 CRIM. L. REv. (Eng.) 548, 554 (1959)).

109. Everett, supra note 107, at 479.
110. See generally id. at 479-81 (describing potential benefits to the defense
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may also help the defense to determine whether to enter a plea
bargain; in fact, prosecutors often disclose these documents of their
own volition in order to encourage a guilty plea, especially when the
documents contain strong inculpatory evidence."'l In an argument for
the expansion of pretrial discovery rights for both defendants and the
state, Justice William Brennan argued that:
[w]hat assigned counsel obviously needs to discharge the
heavy responsibility we give him is at least the opportunity to do
what the state does when the trail is fresh, namely, seek
corroboration of the accused's story, or lack of it, from external
facts through avenues of inquiry opened by what the state has
learned .... To shackle counsel so that he cannot effectively seek

out the truth and afford the accused the representation which is not
his privilege but his absolute right seems seriously to imperil the
bedrock presumptions of innocence.
And might not the expanded discovery benefit the prosecution
as well as the accused? If sharpening of the issues, exposure of
untenable arguments and more efficient marshaling of12the evidence
result from discovery, doesn't the prosecution profit?'
Arguments like these led to a drastic expansion of pretrial
criminal discovery in the 1960s and 1970s,
emphasizing reciprocity of
1 3
defense."
the
and
State
the
rights between
Rule 16(a)(2), which the Advisory Committee and the Supreme
Court refer to as the work product exception, 1 4 was a part of this
expansion. The scope of the exception was hotly debated. Some
argued that the work product exception should be narrower in criminal
cases because the free rider problem-when one party contributes
nothing and merely profits from the other's work-is far less likely to
arise in these cases than in civil trials.115 On the other hand, the
traditional justification for work product-that it encourages factfrom discovery of various documents and other evidence held by the prosecution).
111. Brennan, supra note 108, at 282; see also RICHARD JAY ALLEN ET AL.,
1141 (1st ed. 2001).
112. Brennan, supranote 108, at 287.
113. FED. R. CRiM.P. 16 advisory committee's note A (1975).
114. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., "Work Product" in Criminal Discovery, 1966
321, 335-36 (1960).
COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol44/iss1/4

WASH.

U. L. Q.

16

Shaver: United States v. Fort and the Future of Work Product in Criminal

2007] THE FUTURE OF WORK PRODUCT IN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

143

finding and hence furthers truth and accuracy-is just as strong in the
criminal context. 1 6 In other words, the work product exception should
be broad enough so it does not discourage law enforcement from
engaging in fact-finding for fear that their reports will provide tools
for defendants at trial. Indeed, this seems to be the very policy concern
of the Fort majority: that discovery of the local reports could stifle
17
future cooperation between the SFPD and the federal authorities."
Fort thus demonstrates that the historical tensions around the scope of
work product remain in play today.
Two critical questions which remain unasked in either of the
opinions, however, are what sorts of documents should be considered
work product, and is it any different in criminal versus civil cases?
Specifically, are police reports-whether local, state, or federal-the
work product of an attorney? These reports contain many details, but
the major issue in Fort is the reports as a source of witness
statements.118 But it is far from obvious that witness statements, taken
by police at the crime scene, can be fairly characterized as an
attorney's work product.
There was an initial debate in civil procedure whether work
product should include statements made by witnesses to a party's
agent. 119 Although this is now a well-settled part of civil work
product, it is acknowledged that such statements are not really the
mental process of the lawyer or agent.' 20 In a way, though, they do
reflect attorney work because he or she took the time to locate the
witness and conduct the interview. In the civil context, it makes sense
to encourage each party to do that legwork themselves, because
theoretically each side should have equal access.
But in the criminal context, the considerations are different. For
one thing, the police have access to crime scene witnesses that might
disappear before the defense counsel is even appointed. Additionally,
the prosecution has a degree of access to the law enforcement files
that defendants do not. 21 Thus, perhaps labeling these reports as work

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 336.
See United States v. Fort (Fort1), 472 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1108.
"Work Product" in Criminal Discovery, supra note 115, at 324.
See id.
Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
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product is not appropriate in the criminal context because the truth
seeking/fair trial justifications for work product are not present.
Instead, the purpose of calling them work product seems to be to find
a way to protect the reports' content for other reasons (witness
protection, for example). But the Rules provide other mechanisms to
deal with those concerns.'1 22 Moreover, the prosecution! is mandated by
Brady v. United States 123 to turn over any exculpatory information in
its possession, and any police report will, inevitably, contain
potentially exculpatory information, including the names of witnesses
that may be impeachable. Thus, labeling police reports as work
product creates an inevitable discovery conflict with crucial Brady
rights, and underscores the idea that these reports are not really
deserving of a blanket exception.
Nevertheless, many states' criminal codes explicitly include
police reports in the work product exemption.124 The federal courts
have likewise interpreted Rule 16(a)(2) to include federal law
enforcement reports. 25 But Fort merits revisiting, at least
hypothetically, this fundamental question: "Is it obvious that the work
of police officers should be treated like the work product of a
prosecutor preparing for trial? Are there reasons to exempt police
reports from routine discovery, apart from the policies associated with
the work product doctrine?"' 126 This quotation, from a widely used
Criminal Procedure casebook, goes on to suggest that the real reason
to exempt police reports is because discoverability will result in police
officers minimizing their reporting and will impair the overall efficacy
of law enforcement. 127 This is exactly the concern voiced by the Fort
majority, specifically in relation to cooperation between different law
128
enforcement jurisdictions in organized crime investigations.
Perhaps this is why the majority held that Rule 16(a)(2) is more than
1587, 1616 (2006).
122. For example, the state could move for a protective order. See FED. R.
CutM. P 16(d)(1).
123. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
124. See, e.g., ARiZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.4 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-13-5
(2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904 (2006).
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv.

125. See infra note 130.
126. ALLENETAL., supra note 111, at 1141.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Fort (Fort1), 472 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007).
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just a work product exception.1 29 That is, the majority recognized that
police reports are not truly "work product," but felt that they still
merited protection for policy reasons.
The problem inheres in the fact that, in order to reach its holding,
the majority ran contrary to both the text of the rule and the case law,
both of which are clear that 16(a)(2) is a work product exemption. The
United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit explicitly refer to
16(a)(2) as the work product doctrine or privilege.' 30 The comments to
the Rules refer to 16(a)(2) as a work product rule. The notes state that
"[t]he Committee also changed subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(2), which
set forth 'work product' exceptions to the general discovery
requirements." '1 3 1 In addition, the notes state that Rules 16(a)(2) and
16(b)(2) "define certain types of materials ('work product') not to be
discoverable."1' 32 Therefore, if the majority wanted to find a way to
protect these reports, it should have looked elsewhere in the rules
besides 16(a)(2). As it stands, the opinion seems like an end-run
around the legislature's intentions.
But the dissent is not in the clear, either. The weight of
authority, demonstrated in the legislative record, the case law, and
states' practice, is that police reports are work product and that
16(a)(2) is a work product exception. Thus, in order to allow
defendants to discover these reports, there must be a justification for
treating the work product of local police differently than the work
product of federal law enforcement. This justification is found in the
concept of agency: when local police officers act as agents for local
prosecutors, their work should be considered work product. In
contrast, when federal prosecutors take over an investigation years
after the local police began it, the local officers cannot logically be
considered agents of the federal government for those initial years.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "agent" as "[o]ne who is authorized to
act for or in the place of another."' 3 3 According to the Restatement of

129. Id. at 1116.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996); United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d
1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000).
131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note B (1975).
132. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note D (1975).
133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (8th ed. 2004).
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Agency, "[a] principal's right to control the agent is a constant across
relationships of agency."' 134 The Fort majority failed to offer any
normative reason why these police officers should be "agents" of the
federal prosecutor, and instead relied on textual arguments to
demonstrate that the word "government" did not refer just to the
federal government.
In Judge Wardlaw's dissent, it emerges that what is essential in
her interpretation of agency is not a question of jurisdiction, but a
question of timing; had the "Down Below Gang" investigation been a
joint state-federal effort from the start, the reports would
unquestionably be protected work product.' 35 But given that the
federal agents in this case came on years after the state
investigation, 136 the dissent is persuasive in that the reports cannot
logically be considered the work of an agent of the federal
government. Therefore, there is a sound reason for distinguishing
between local and federal police reports for work product purposes.
B. Policy
The majority position is supported by a reasonable policy
judgment: requiring disclosure of these reports may inhibit
cooperation between state and federal law enforcement. However, the
majority makes only one fleeting reference to this concern.1 37 To
complete the picture left blank in the opinion, it is worthwhile to
consider the practical implications of protecting these reports. That is,
did the majority get it right as a normative issue, if not as a matter of
law?
The answer is a resounding no. There is no evidence that the past
practice of allowing discovery of local police reports chilled law
enforcement cooperation in federal investigations. On the contrary,
recent years have seen only a growth of such cooperation, often in the
form of a joint federal-state effort138 -a practice which the dissent's
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
135. United States v. Fort (Fort I1), 478 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Wardlaw, J., dissenting) ("[S]uch a joint-investigation showing, which would have
justified the claim of privilege, was never made by the federal prosecutors.").
136. Id. at 1101.
137. United States v. Fort (Fort1), 472 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2007).
138. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 2.

134.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol44/iss1/4

20

Shaver: United States v. Fort and the Future of Work Product in Criminal

2007] THE FUTURE OF WORK PRODUCT IN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

147

position would not preclude. In its briefs to the court, the government
never offered any evidence that federal-state law enforcement would
suffer if the dissent had prevailed. This is true even in jurisdictions
where such data is readily available because courts have explicitly
held that local police reports are not the work product of federal
prosecutors. 139
Moreover, the practical effect of Fort is a disaster for criminal
trial practice in general and defendants in particular. In fact, thirteen
different federal public and community defenders filed an Amicus
brief endorsing Judge Fletcher's dissent and urging rehearing.140 They
argued that Fort will have wide-reaching effects, not only concerning
police reports, but for all of criminal discovery.14 Ultimately, it will
benefit neither the criminally accused nor the prosecution.
Fort will affect a large number of cases. The Amicus brief states
that between thirty and sixty percent of cases in the federal defenders
offices were either originated by or involved local police. 142 Recall,
too, that in United States v. Cherry, ninety-five percent of the
documents in the prosecution's possession came from the NYCPD's
independent investigation. 43 This is therefore not a trifling matter; in
RICO cases especially, the discoverability of local police reports is a
44
crucial issue.'
One practical effect of Fort is that it drastically enhances the
scope of the government's Brady obligations. "If a local agency is a
'government agent' for Rule 16 purposes, it should also be deemed an
agent for Brady purposes. This extends the federal government's
Brady duties to include information in the control of local agencies
that participated in the 'case."",145 Although the majority stated that its
opinion was not intended to diminish the government's Brady
obligations, 14 6 the majority's own symmetry arguments implicate the

139. See supra pp. 139-40.
140. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 13-14.
141. Id. at 1-2.
142. Id. at 2.
143. United States v. Cherry, 876 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
144. See, e.g., id.
145. United States v. Fort (Fort II), 478 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
146. United States v. Fort (Fort1), 472 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007).
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opposite result: that Brady obligations will be expanded. Without
input from the defense during the back-and-forth of discovery, it will
be impossible for even the most well-intentioned prosecutor to comply
with Brady.147 Brady mistakes will then lead, in turn, to another set of
problems: "This is a recipe for mistrial or reversal on appeal-a result
that delays justice, and wastes prosecutorial resources, judicial
resources, and jury time, particularly in complex criminal cases (the
very cases most affected by the panel majority's opinion).' 48
Another effect of Fort is that it encourages a work product
discovery war between the prosecution and the defense. The
majority's reasoning allows materials to retroactively become federal
work product. 149 Accordingly, because 16(a)(2) and 16(b)(2) are
reciprocal, either the prosecution or the defense could withhold
preexisting investigative materials based upon the subsequent creation
of an agency relationship with their federal counterparts. 50 The
majority argued that this possibility would be curtailed because in
order to be protected, documents must be "nonpublic" and "made by
an 'other government agent in connection with investigating or
prosecuting the case."" 5 But if the agency relationship can be created
after the document is made, and the "case" refers to a person rather
than a procedure, this is actually a huge class of documents. Perhaps
this is what Judge Wardlaw had in mind when she listed "encouraging
gamesmanship" as the first practical concern of Fort.152 This will be
especially true if the government is aggressive in labeling materials as
privileged-conduct which will merely encourage the defense to lock
up as much material as possible. Fort will therefore turn criminal
discovery back into the "sporting event" that Justice Brennan decried
so long ago, rather than a search for truth. 153
Most importantly, Fort means that the overall quality of public
defense will decline as defense attorneys have to scramble to get the
basic documents indicting their clients. As the Amicus brief argues,
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

FortH, 478 F.3d at 1106 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1107.
See FortL,472 F.3d at 1125-26.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 11.
Fort 1, 472 F.3d at 1120 n. 15 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P 16(a)(2)).

152.

See FortH, 478 F.3d at 1106 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).

153. Brennan, supra note 108, at 279.
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"4any limitation on access to state and local police reports will
adversely affect the quality of justice, diminish the effectiveness of
counsel's representation, and result in increased costs under the
Criminal Justice Act as counsel are required to expend resources to
obtain the reports from other sources."' 54 Judge Wardlaw's dissent
echoes these sentiments, citing concern over both the increased costs
of public defense and the inevitable decline in quality that will
55
ensue. 1
The desirability of making these documents discoverable is
highlighted by the fact that prosecutors routinely turn over police
reports to the defense.156 The federal public defender for the district of
Oregon, for example, stated that the local prosecutor "as a matter of
routine, provides the reports generated by state and local police
officers."' 157 And one California criminal defense lawyer said of police
reports, "we often get them in discovery in state cases without request.
Reason: they almost always contain material we are entitled to under
the [California] discovery statute."' 158 This practice is common among
prosecutors for several reasons, which reflect some of the arguments
above. First, the reports will inevitably contain some Brady material.
Second, local statutes might mandate disclosure of some or all of the
information, and it saves time to just disclose it all. Third, presenting
the defense with the weight of the evidence leads more easily to plea
bargains, which benefits the state. But regardless of the reason, the
fact that turning over these reports is a routine practice for many
prosecutors supports the contention that it is a necessary part of
making the system function.
In sum, the practical results of Fort are the opposite of what the
majority predicted. Rather than facilitating law enforcement by
enhancing federal-state cooperation, Fort will have adverse effects on
the ability of the system to work successfully. The prosecution will be
unable to comply with its Brady obligations, criminal trials are

154. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 2.
155. Fort H,478 F.3d at 1108 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
156.

See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.

157. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 5A.
158. E-mail from Charles Sevilla, California criminal defense lawyer, to Anne
Shaver (Apr. 16, 2007, 3:17 WST) (on file with author).
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encouraged to turn into work product discovery wars, and the overall
quality of public defense is threatened.
VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to review the decision in Fort, and should reverse. The
Ninth Circuit opinion is not supported by the text of the Rules, by the
legislative history, or by policy. Both Fort and its only companion,
U.S. v. Cherry, rely on a single policy concern-law enforcement
cooperation-to justify their holding. Not only does their position lack
empirical merit, but it also overrides the policy decision of the
legislature to enact a narrow work product rule in criminal discovery.
A reversal would protect the truth-seeking values of liberal
discovery, respect the legislature's intentions, and preserve the
efficacy of criminal discovery procedure.
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